'Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship. The act that endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth.' (Peter F. Drucker) In environments where information asymmetries, intense competition and changing market conditions are ever-present, the debate over which factors facilitate the rate of innovation and growth of entrepreneurial and emerging firms continues to thrive in many forums and research arenas (Dickson and DeSanctis, 2001; Huber, 2004; Tapscott et al, 2000) . While a variety of innovation practices, processes and outcomes assist entrepreneurial firms to increase their overall effectiveness and performance, discerning between different types of factors at the socioeconomic level that enable these firms to achieve higher quality, flexibility, low-cost structures and promptness of delivery (Gibbons and O'Connor, 2003) still needs to be validated. Entrepreneurial firms in countries with less support and structure for enabling innovation may be at a competitive disadvantage compared with those in countries that have resources, personnel and funding for innovation (Simon et al, 2002) .
What accounts for these disadvantages and the differences in the rate and diffusion of innovation between countries? Data and information provided by the European Union (EU) 27, Japan and the USA provide an opportunity to examine such differences directly. For example, while 42% of enterprises in the EU 27 reported some form of innovation activity 1 The purpose of our study is to answer the empirical questions, 'How are the countries in these groups different and are those differences important?' That is, we seek to understand the true nature of the underlying classifications. Based upon data from the Eurostat, Global Financial Data and Transparency International data sites, we find that government-oriented issues/ policies such as social protection, the hourly wage and productivity are important in fostering a climate conducive to innovation. Equally important, given the diverse social-economic and/or the administrative backgrounds of the sample countries, is the likelihood of the misuse of public power for private gain, ie the perception of government corruption. We are able to discern the relative importance of various factors such as the difference between foreign R&D versus governmentsponsored R&D, the difference between early-and later-stage venture capital support, and the difference between established and young researchers in fostering and supporting innovation activity within their respective countries.
These differences and our study results are important because of the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurship. As Drucker (1985, p 30) points out: 'Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship'. Julien and Marchesnay (1996) join Drucker when they affirm:
'Innovation constitutes the foundation of entrepreneurship, offering new ideas or products, new goods or services, or still, to reorganize the company. Innovation, is to create a company different from … before, it is to discover or transform a product, it is to propose a new way of doing things, of distributing or of selling. ' (p.35) In the following sections, we describe our data and methods in greater depth. We present our findings, which reveal key differences between the four groups. We then discuss our results and, given the empirical purpose of our study, we conduct appropriate post-hoc analyses to tease out those discriminating variables that separately and jointly affect innovative activity. We conclude with a section devoted to study limitations and directions for future research, with a final discussion on the role of government in innovation.
Methods
Most of our data were collected recently through the Annual Eurostat R&D questionnaires. Data on Government Expenses on Research and Development (GERD) When the Eurostat data site did not contain adequately detailed information (ie on per capita gross domestic product [GDP] and changes in the consumer price index) for all relevant years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , supplemental data were obtained from the Global Financial Data Website (www.globalfindata.com) which, in turn, obtains these data from the relevant government archives or agencies.
In addition, we supplemented the Eurostat data with information from Transparency International. Specifically, we extracted from their 2005 Corruption Perception Index the relevant evaluation for each sample country. This index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the index ask questions that relate to the misuse of public power for private benefit, for example, bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, or questions that probe the strength of anti-corruption policies, thereby encompassing both administrative and political corruption. Our purpose in including these data was to verify the costs of corruption as argued by Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2004) , who contend that, among other things, corruption leads to misallocation of resources, a lack of competitiveness and efficiency, lower public revenues for essential goods and services, lower productivity and lower levels of innovation, plus lower growth and private sector employment rates. Using our macroeconomic data in combination with Eurostat's Innovation Index and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index allows us to verify whether these statements apply to the countries in this study. Patents per million inhabitants. Patent application data came from the European Patent Office (EPO). EPO data refer to all patent applications (as opposed to patents granted) by priority year.
Measures
Innovation index. The European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) was used as our dependent variable on overall innovation within a sample country. A total of 26 EIS indicators used to measure innovation performance are categorized along five categories and in two main themes: inputs and outputs: A description of the index and its indicators for each subscale is provided in Appendix A.
Results
We commence with an overview of the differences in the general economic conditions between the four groups. Here, we are interested in overall characteristics and variables as shown in Table 1 . Differences between the four groups were examined using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) along with post-hoc Fisher's least significant difference test (LSD) intergroup analyses to compare differences between two and three groups at a time. This method compares all possible pairs of means after the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the groups do not differ. We report the means, standard deviations and Fstatistics, as well as LSD mean difference comparisons in a variety of formats and importance (in our tables and in Appendix B). We also report the effect sizes (ES) -Cohen's d for each of the variables. These sizes indicate whether a statistically significant difference is a material difference. Effect sizes can also be interpreted in terms of the percentage of non-overlap between groups (see Cohen, 1988) . Given our purpose as well as the sample size, we included the effect sizes to highlight the relative contribution of each of the factors in explaining the variance between the groups.
As shown in Table 1 , leaders demonstrate higher per capita GDP, higher hourly wages, higher total compensation and higher levels of social protection, while having lower levels of unemployment, inflation (changes in the consumer price index) and perceived corruption. In general, the results change monotonically through the remaining groups, with the exception being those countries in the catch-up group, which have lower unemployment rates, lower salaries and lower total compensation than those countries in the trailing group. Hence we find prima facie evidence supporting the Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2004) contention of adverse economic effects of corruption. Pisano (1997) and Drucker (1998) found that the level of research and development funding was an important determinant in the level of innovation and entrepreneurial activity. As shown in Table 2a , there is no significant difference between the amount spent by leaders and followers in terms of total R&D expenses; however, there is a statistically significant difference between these two groups and each of the trailing and catch-up groups. A similar finding emerges when examining the amount of R&D spending contributed by the industrial sector (Table 2b) .
More important is the interpretation of the results in Tables 2c and 2d . Government R&D expenditures seem to be directed principally at the trailing and catch-up groups, with no discernible difference being made between the leaders and followers. What then accounts for the difference between these two front runners? According to Table 2d , it appears that it is the leaders' ability to attract foreign sources of R&D funds that accounts for the marginal difference between these two groups. Angel (1991) and Audretsch (1998) among others have pointed out that innovation is a function of the number of researchers in the field. A MANOVA comparison of all researchers in all sectors of the economy fails to discern any statistical differences between the four groups. However, as Table 3a demonstrates, there is a statistical difference between the number of business researchers in the leaders and followers and those in the other two groups. It is in these latter two groups that one sees a statistical difference (Table 3b ) in the number of government researchers, suggesting that innovation in these latter two groups is more of a government-directed function than one emanating from private enterprise. A similar issue arises when one examines the number of researchers in higher education. Again, there is no discernible difference between the numbers of academic researchers in any of the four categories. However, as Table 4 demonstrates, while there is no difference between leaders and followers in terms of the number of doctoral students, there is a marked and significant difference between the leaders and the last two categories. One might put forward two possible conjectures on these results. First, innovation is a young researcher's game and thus, the finding is not surprising, or second, the last two categories suffer from a brain drain from the domestic to the leader and follower countries. Angel (1991) and Kemp et al (2002) stated that it was important to have a critical mass of high-tech workers to foster an innovation-conducive environment. Tables 5 and 6 address this issue by examining first, the percentage of high-tech workers as a percentage of the total workforce, and then by examining the total number of patents applied for per one million inhabitants. Here, we begin to see the separation between the leader and follower groups. In every case, the leaders have a significantly higher percentage of high-tech workers than any other group. As with government researchers, foreign and industrial R&D expenditures, the trailing group has statistically higher numbers and levels than the catch-up group. In terms of patent applications, it seems that success breeds success, as the leader category outperforms all others. Further, it appears that this category is highly correlated with Eurostat's innovation index, as each category outperforms the next, although there is no discernible difference between the trailing and catch-up groups. Timmons and Bygrave (1986) and Zider (1998) have suggested that a key success factor to innovation and entrepreneurial activity is the existence of early-and later-stage venture capital (VC) funding. We find corroborating evidence (Tables 7 and 8 ), although we cannot find any statistical difference between the trailing and catch-up groups in early-stage funding. When later-stage funding is examined, there is no discernible difference between the two leading categories, but a statistically significant difference with respect to the two latter categories, suggesting that the success of the two former categories is due at least in part to later-stage VC funding.
Discussion and implications for government's role in innovation
Successful entrepreneurs are grounded in strategic innovation practices, and must adopt modes of experimentation and flexibility that enable them to alter the design, distribution and sales of goods and services (Amor, 2000; Drucker, 1997; Lumpkin and Dess, 2004) . Our results suggest that, while the influence of government encourages innovation on such factors as government-funded R&D and research in the trailing and catch-up groups, there are discernible differences between these two groups and the leaders and followers. Leaders and followers have similar characteristics in levels of total R&D and industrial sector R&D expenditures, the amount of late-stage venture capital funding as well as business and university (PhD students) involvement, in contrast to the latter two groups. However, the distinct differences between the groups were more apparent between the leaders and followers than between the trailing and catching-up countries. That is, the leaders had higher levels of foreign R&D investments, high-technology workers, numbers of patent applications and early-stage funding for entrepreneurial ventures.
To understand which of these factors were driving the observed differences and which hierarchical combination of factors accounted for such differences, we conducted a post-hoc multiple discriminant analysis, with the four groups as the dependent variables and the significant variables in our MANOVA results as the independent variables. Additionally, because government plays a crucial role in encouraging innovation, we included another government variable -the perception of corruption -in our multivariate analysis. This analysis (Table 9 ) finds three significant discriminant functions: the first accounts for 76.4% of the discriminating power and is highly aligned with the perception of corruption, high-tech workers and both total R&D and industrial R&D as a percentage of GDP. The second function is highly aligned with both foreign R&D as a percentage of GDP and business researchers, while the final function is highly aligned with PhD students as well as early-and late-stage venture capital funding. The group centroids (Figure 2 ) further reveal the differences across the two primary discriminant functions.
Since the corruption index has the highest loading and discriminating power among the two groups, we examine these differences in an additional post-hoc analysis. Figure 3 displays the box plot of the means and variances of the four groups. While leaders and followers have similar profiles, the catch-up and trailing groups are significantly higher on the corruption index.
Although the dispersion between the catch-up and trailing groups is similar, the median for the catch-up group reveals the skewness of the data. Many of the countries in this group are former Soviet-bloc members and have much improvement to be made. In sum, given the combination of many of these findings, policies directed at lowering perceived government corruption along with R&D funding and resources from the private business/industrial sector may be some of the first priorities to be initiated, particularly in the trailing and catch-up groups. The EU report, Policy, Indicators and Targets: Measuring the Impacts of Innovation Policies, provides detailed information and recommendations on where progress, resources and funding can be sought and targeted for planned improvements and solutions. In this report, Arundel and Hollanders (2005) emphasize that current conditions can have a significant influence on the types of innovation policies and practices that EU countries address to improve their innovation performance. In common with our findings, they found that public authorities ought to improve their support of innovation, especially with respect to 'improvement of image'. This was the focus of discussion beyond other government activities such as tax reduction on R&D, financial support to projects, information transfer and transnational relations. In the latest discussions between EU ministers addressing the innovation capacity and future competitiveness of the Union, they advocate that the legislative and regulatory environment for entrepreneurs needs to be modified to provide greater visibility and rewards for innovation. These modifications include less red tape, reform of state aid rules and public procurement practices, as well as using the EU's structural, regional and social funds more intensely to finance innovation. Many of these recommendations, confirmed as related yet secondary variables here, fail to mention how image and reputation are to be factored in to a government's innovation strategy and policy.
Study limitations and directions for future research
One limitation of our study is its reliance on secondary data to analyse differences across the four groups. While we found many macro-level differences, it would be interesting to incorporate other measures and subscales of innovation. For example, while there are five specific subscales of the innovation index, it may be interesting to examine how each is related to our socioeconomic factors, as well as how each contributes to the level of activity and involvement of business and industryrelated factors in enabling innovation, specifically in countries and groups that lack innovation capital, technological resources and expertise.
A second related issue is the likelihood of underestimation of certain variable such as per capita GDP, especially in countries with greater amounts of perceived government and administrative corruption. As an example, Slovakia, one of the trailing economies, which ranked seventh out of the 34 countries studied in terms of the level of corruption, was found to have an underground economy estimated at between 20 and 40% of GDP (Sicakova, 1999) . This one country illustration is in line with Sullivan's (2000) assertion that:
'Firms that refuse to participate in corrupt transactions may find themselves forced out of certain markets . . . [D] omestic firms, especially small businesses are much more vulnerable . . . they (too) can leave the market . . . they can emigrate into the informal or underground economy.' (p 1)
In addition, while we were able to measure many variables, additional research should investigate how new 2004-05 policy changes and initiatives will affect innovation in the coming years. New economic and government policies and regulations encouraging shifts in the industrial, economic and regulatory environments may not reach full effectiveness in the short term. Longitudinal studies, similar to ours, will need to be conducted to understand the effects of planned initiatives and targets.
Conclusion
Our study examines empirically how countries differed in their innovation classifications and which factors contributed to a country's innovation activity. We were able to find a hierarchy of discriminating variables between the classification of groups that can inform interested parties which factors facilitate and enable innovation to occur within specific countries. While previous research and reports (eg Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) have provided an unprecedented amount of data on entrepreneurial behaviour and activity across countries, our study takes an expanded yet nuanced view, and questions previous assumptions regarding innovation. Although we do not argue that entrepreneurial and innovation policy should be of the 'one size fits all' type, there may be certain measures and activities that can encourage and support innovation. Based on our results, the effectiveness of these activities would need to be customized depending on the institutional context and environment -which would include a confluence of the economic, political and legal, as well as cultural factors that directly influence entrepreneurial behaviour and thus, the innovative activity of the country. An institutional context that is conducive to innovative activity -including monetary stability, ability to attract technology capital, resources and talent, market fairness and openness, respect and enforcement of the rules of law -is a fundamental responsibility of key governmental players and parties.
By studying how different socioeconomic factors relate to innovation, we shed new light on the government, business/technical and human capital factors that underlie macro-level differences between countries. We extend previous research by approaching our longitudinal analyses at the country level and integrating multiple socioeconomic factors that have been suggested to influence the rate and diffusion of innovation. By providing a robust empirical test, we examined a hierarchy of factors that may affect how a country initiates and fosters future innovative behaviour. An improved understanding of these factors may inform and assist government and policy makers in prioritizing a target set of improvements, initiatives and programmes that foster entrepreneurship and growth-oriented activity.
Notes
1 Luxembourg, Cyprus, Romania, Norway and Turkey are all outliers and are not obvious members of any group. For comparison purposes, we include them in our analyses. 2 See www.transparency.org for a description of the survey methods.
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